Ⅰ. Introduction
After a half-century of existence, there are still conflicting views on the importance and effectiveness of the adjustment programs by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The broad objectives of IMF-supported programs are the attainment of a viable balance of payments, low inflation, and satisfactory long-term growth.
1) Accordingly, studies evaluating IMF programs tend to center on whether the program participation has improved balance of payments and current account balance, lowered inflation, and stimulated growth.
2)
The literature, however, has largely ignored the mechanisms by which IMF programs achieve their macroeconomic outcomes and has instead attempted to assess whether IMF programs have been "effective"in achieving the broader macroeconomic objectives.
3)
Thus, the precise nature of the underlying economic relationships and the specific policies adopted are not made explicit. In other words, it is not clear whether IMF programs have an impact through the policy conditions that are imposed or through other ways; for example, it is difficult to distinguish between the effects of the policies in IMF programs and the effects of IMF finance that accompany the programs. 4) It is possible that IMF loans have no effect on policy and simply subsidize policy that undermines stabilization, due to government' s noncompliance.
The literature is now beginning to look at the question of compliance with policy conditions to understand the effects of IMF programs on macroeconomic outcomes. When a country experiencing a balance of payments problem borrows from the IMF, its government must follow economic and financial policies prescribed by the IMF, a requirement known as conditionality.
6) The conditionality by the IMF includes complex packages of policy measures that have multiple targets and that typically call for fiscal austerity on the part of government, an increase in domestic interest rates, greater investment, trade liberalization, and so on.
7) The IMF aims to lay a basis for economic stability and growth by influencing government policy. Therefore, understanding the micro-level policy impacts of the IMF through conditionality enables a better understanding of the effectiveness of IMF programs on macroeconomic outcomes.
This article aims to fill the gap in the literature by focusing on whether IMF programs effectively reduce the budget deficit of a participating country. This issue is important because fiscal austerity is at the heart of IMF-supported programs. The fiscal dimension of macroeconomic management includes policy measures that seek to curtail government expenditures and increase revenues to restore viability to the public sector finance.
8) The fiscal adjustment strategies may be tailored to the specific nature of the member country, but on average are intended to increase revenue through tax policy and administrative reforms designed to broaden the revenue base and restrain expenditure.
9)
Despite the ubiquity of the fiscal austerity requirement in IMF conditions, so far only a few studies have addressed the question of IMF programs'effect on budget balance.
10)
6) Each country that is a member of the Fund (currently 186) contributes a deposit held by the IMF. The IMF then allows its members in distress to borrow foreign exchange from the IMF. By providing countries with loans during financial crises, the IMF plays the role of an international lender of last resort. The conditionality programs require the member country to fulfill agreement obligations and carry out policy reforms accordingly in exchange for financial support from the fund. 7) Khan (1990) . 8) Manuel Guitian, "Conditionality: Past, Present, Future,"IMF Staff Papers 42-4 (1995) , p. 800; Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) , p. 388. Such fiscal adjustment strategies underlie the three different types of credit arrangements: stand-by arrangements, extended Fund facility, and the structural adjustment facility. While there are differences among the arrangements, these arrangements share the same fundamental objectives. Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) Those earlier studies lack methods to correct for selection bias that is commonly associated with the studies of program participation. Since countries enter IMF programs when they have economic problems, one needs to control for the selectivity in their participation when estimating the effects of IMF programs. Moreover, earlier studies rely on the measure of budget balance as a proportion of GDP, which could be problematic given some of the earlier studies'findings that IMF programs undermine economic growth. This article addresses the problems of earlier studies by employing a selection model to correct for selection bias and using variables measuring the change in budget balance as well as expenditure and revenue in local currency.
Using the data of 93 developing countries from 1951 to 2000, this article finds that IMF programs are effective in reducing government expenditures but fail to increase revenue. Therefore, IMF program participation does not influence overall budget deficits.
The findings suggest that IMF conditionality effectively reduces expenditures while countries are participating in the programs. However, it is difficult to predict the longterm effects of conditionality from the findings. If IMF programs fail to increase revenue even in the long run and simply cut the expenditures, this will create problems in the economy.
This article is organized as follows. First, it briefly reviews previous studies and their shortcomings, namely nonrandom selection and their inaccurate measure of budget deficits. Next, it explains the selection problem and determinants of participation in IMF programs. Lastly, it analyzes the effects of IMF programs on budget deficit, expenditure, and revenue, and suggests the implications of the findings.
Ⅱ. IMF Program Participation and Budget Deficits: Background
Previous Studies and Issues
In the literature on the effectiveness of IMF programs in economic adjustment, only a few studies have tested the effects IMF programs on budget balances. Killick et al. and Schadler et al. evaluate the effects of IMF programs by looking at the performance of countries before entering the program and after the program ends. 11) They test the effects of IMF programs on balance of payments, inflation and growth, and various policy variables such as exchange rates and debt service in addition to central 11) Killick et al. (1992) ; Schadler et al. (1993 One problem with such studies is that they use the measure of budget balance and expenditure as a proportion of GDP. Normalizing some economic variables using GDP is desirable in most cases because it controls for the size of economy among countries.
However, it becomes problematic when GDP decreases but the economic variable in question remains the same. Many studies have found that IMF programs are negatively associated with economic growth, implying that IMF programs may reduce GDP in participating countries. 13) For example, even when a country' s deficit remains the same, it may still appear to be large because GDP, the denominator, is now reduced. Therefore, it would be useful to have a measure of budget balance not as a proportion of GDP in order to correctly assess the impact of IMF programs.
14)
Another problem with earlier studies concerns the fact that selection into IMF programs is nonrandom. Countries enter the programs when they are experiencing economic difficulties. Most of the previous studies on the effects of IMF programs do not control for selection bias and instead rely on three basic approaches, all of which have difficulties of their own. The first one is the before-after approach, which evaluates the effects of IMF programs by comparing the performance of countries before entering the program and after the program ends.
15) The problem with this approach is that it implicitly attributes the impact of extraneous factors to the programs in place. Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) ; James Vreeland, The IMF and Economic Development (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Universty Press, 2003). 14) For comparison, however, I report the regression results using budget balance/GDP in Appendix 4. 15) Killick et al. (1992) ; Schadler et al. (1993) . 16) Mercer-Blackman and Unigovskaya (2000), p. 5; Vreeland (2003), p. 108. countries with similar non-participating countries. The difference in performance is attributed to program participation.
17) The problem with this approach is that the observed difference may reflect the conditions which led governments to sign IMF agreements in the first place. 18) Third, the generalized evaluation estimator approach corrects for observable determinants of nonrandom selection of program countries by controlling for those observable determinants. This method, however, does not account for the possibility that unobserved factors may also play a role in selection and performance. 19) In the next section, I discuss the selection problem in more detail and the methods that I use to correct for it.
The Selection Problem
To estimate the effects of IMF programs, one must draw inferences about an unobserved counterfactual: in other words, the task is to compare outcomes if countries had participated and not participated in the programs under the same conditions. What one observes in the real world are not experiments, which would match "treatment"and "control"groups, thus permitting direct inferences about the effects of IMF programs.
Since the situation of countries that participate in IMF programs differ from those that do not, observed differences in budget deficits may depend on these differing situations as well as the inherent effects of IMF programs. Because selection is not random, one may not always be able to match the observed cases for these conditions. Furthermore, not all of these conditions are observable (e.g., political will and trust that contribute to governments'decision to enter the programs). 20) A methodology that fails to account for such unobservable variables may result in biased estimates of the effects of IMF programs.
To capture the effects of the relevant unobserved variables, it is necessary to look at the error terms in statistical models. The error term represents unobserved explanatory variables, which are usually assumed to be random disturbances. If the error terms The level of economic development. The level of economic development is measured by per capita income. Low-income countries are more likely to seek the Fund assistance because they generally have only limited access to private international capital markets.
Also, low-income countries may need technical assistance to develop well-functioning institutions.
22)
Balance of payments and international reserve needs. A country that has a balance of payments and international reserve needs for financial resources is more likely to seek IMF assistance.
Elections in the previous year. Governments are more likely to enter IMF agreements early in their election terms or after elections, hoping that the blame for signing an agreement will be forgotten before the next elections.
23)
Debt service and investment. When debt service is high, a government is likely to enter IMF programs for financial assistance. Governments are also likely to turn to the IMF when investment is low because a decrease in domestic investment results in decreased revenue for government.
Length of current participation and number of other countries under the program.
Countries are more likely to remain in the program in the year right after their first participation year, and the probability to leave the program increases as time goes on. Knight and Santaella (1997) , p. 419. 23) Przeworski and Vreeland (2000) .
The variable measuring the length of current participation, when included in the model, can control for the temporal dependence of observations. At the same time, the more countries currently participating in an IMF program, the more likely a particular country is to continue participating. Signing an IMF agreement can be costly for the governments that do so because they have to follow IMF conditions and thus sacrifice some sovereignty in return for a loan. Therefore, the sovereignty costs are reduced when many other countries are under IMF programs.
24)
Budget deficit. A government facing a large budget deficit may turn to the IMF to finance its deficit. In the preliminary regression in Table 1 , I include budget deficit to test whether budget deficit is significantly associated with IMF participation. If so, there would be a simultaneity problem. As it turns out in Table 1 , however, budget deficit is not a significant determinant of participation. Therefore, I do not include budget deficit in the models later. Table 1 shows the result of the probit model on the determinants of the selection into IMF programs. Countries with higher levels of international reserves and investment are less likely to enter the programs. On the other hand, governments with higher levels of debt service are likely to join the programs. As the length of current program participation increases, governments are more likely to exit the program. A country is more likely to be in the program when there are more countries already in the program.
Balance of payments and budget deficits are not significantly associated with IMF program participation.
The statistical evidence shows that the selection into IMF programs is not random.
However, while this result presents the observed determinants of selection, one still needs to understand that unobserved factors may matter in determining selection into programs. With this preliminary understanding on the selection into IMF programs, I now turn to evaluating the effects of IMF programs on budget deficits. 24) Vreeland (2003) , pp. 11, 87.
Ⅲ. The Effect of IMF Programs on Budget Deficit: Empirical Analysis
In this section, I address the main question of this study: do IMF programs discipline budget deficits? I first explain the variables used in the analysis and then present the statistical model as well as the regression results. It is important to note that budget deficit is itself endogenous, affected by the state of the economy as well as affecting it.
25)
This implies potential simultaneity problems between the dependent variable and the control variables. I lag all control variables by one year to avoid simultaneity problems. 26) 25) Fischer (1989) , p. 3. 26) A description of the variables and sources appear in the appendix. 
Dependent Variables
The main dependent variables in this study are the changes of budget balance, government expenditure, and revenue. The reason for using the change variables is twofold. First, the main focus is on how IMF programs influence the change of a country' s fiscal situation. Second, as discussed earlier, budget balance and government expenditure data as a proportion of GDP could be problematic due to IMF programs' negative association with economic growth and GDP. This means data on budget balance and expenditure 'not'measured in GDP terms are required. To concurrently address the negative impact of IMF programs on GDP and different-sized economies, I
measure those data as the rate of changes (that is, [value in year t -value in year t-1]/value in year t-1). Since I use the dependent variables as change, all of the relevant control variables are changes as well.
Independent Variable
Participation in IMF programs. A dummy variable is coded 1 for the country-years when there was a conditioned IMF agreement in force, 0 otherwise. I do not distinguish between the four different types of IMF agreements because they share the same fiscal objectives.
27)

Control Variables
1) Economic determinants
Growth rate. Government' s budget often depends on the state of the economy. On one hand, there could be a positive relationship between economic output and the expansion of the government spending based on the assumption that pressure for social progress leads to the growth of the public sector; on the other hand, where economic growth is so modest that the government generates insufficient revenues to meet demands for additional public goods, those demands must be met through an expansion of government spending.
28) The growth rate can also proxy for the unemployment rate. 
2) Structural determinant
The efficiency of the tax system. An economy with an inefficient tax system cannot collect as large an amount of tax revenues as an economy with an efficient tax system. Two major factors influencing the level of the efficiency of the tax system in a country are variables that account for the sectoral composition of GDP and urbanization.
31) The larger the relative size of the agricultural sector in an economy, the higher the costs of administration and enforcement of tax collection. This implies a less efficient tax system, thus leading to a larger budget deficit for a given level of government expenditures.
3) Political and institutional determinants
Political business cycle. This model assumes that politicians attempt to manipulate the economy for electoral purposes. 32) Thus, in election years politicians pursue expansionary policies in order to boost the economy in time to secure electoral support from myopic voters (as evidenced by a sample of OECD countries). The type of government. Some analysts claim that the type of government affects the size of budget deficits. 37) One-party majority governments maintain tighter fiscal discipline, whereas coalition governments are more undisciplined and weaker. The argument is that while a single-party government can easily shift costs to outside members, governing parties in a coalition government are likely to disagree over any fiscal policy that is against their constituencies'interests. Achieving fiscal discipline is facilitated by a broad and consistent fiscal strategy supported by a more consolidated government. As a result, government debt reflects the inability of the government to reach agreement on fiscal policy.
4) Control variables in the selection model
As shown earlier, selection into IMF programs is not random. If the variables that mattered for inclusion into IMF programs also influence budget balance and government expenditures, those variables also need to be controlled. 38) Moreover, those variables are likely to be the determinants of budget balance, government expenditure, and revenue based on the following rationale: 38) The length of current participation is not included in the model because of potential endogeneity problem: just as participation in the IMF is not random, the length of participation is not as well (i.e., countries with a worse economy stay longer in the programs). There is no good way to deal with the endogeneity of this variable because we do not have a model for length of participation. Therefore, one can avoid the problem by dropping this variable.
Income. Income is particularly relevant to the revenue side of a government budget.
Tax revenue grows with increases in income for two reasons: first, there is simply more income to be taxed when people are earning more. Second, as people earn more income, they move into higher tax brackets and the average tax rate that they pay increases. In this article, income is measured by GDP per capita.
International reserves. One way to finance a government budget deficit is to use foreign exchange reserves. 39) While the use of international reserves to finance the deficit has a clear limit in that exhaustion of reserves will be associated with currency devaluation and as a result can provoke capital flight and a balance of payments crisis, the government can hope to mitigate the inflationary effects of a deficit compared to financing a deficit by printing money.
Debt service. One way of financing the public sector deficit is direct foreign borrowing.
Most of the countries that developed debt servicing difficulties run excessively large public deficits.
40)
Investment. An increase in domestic investment results in increased revenue for government because governments collect taxes from firms.
Balance of payments.
A credit in balance of payments is likely to improve the budget balance of a country because the country has more foreign exchange. If a country has a balance of payment crisis it is likely to have insufficient foreign reserves, which could be a source for deficit financing.
41)
The Model
As mentioned earlier, one of the most important design issues for the analysis is that participation in IMF programs is endogenous. Statistical methods are affected by the modeling of this endogenous variable.
The equation that accounts for the effects of IMF programs on budget deficits is where y i denotes budget deficits, z i is a dummy variable indicating whether or not a country participated in IMF programs, and χ i is a vector of control variables.
To correct for self-selectivity, one needs the selection equation in addition to the 39) Stanley Fischer, "The Economics of Government Budget Constraint,"The World Bank Working Papers No. 224 (1989) . 40) Fischer (1989) , p. 12. 41) Fischer (1989) , pp. 7-13. are correlated, the unobserved variables that drive participation also determine the size of budget deficits, which will lead to a biased estimator.
Results
I present three different models for each dependent variable, according to the slightly different model specifications.
Tables 2 to 4 present selection-corrected regressions results on the change of budget balance, government expenditure, and revenue, respectively. 42) The variable Hazard accounts for the presence of selection bias in the estimates of parameters in the models.
In Table 2 , the coefficients are statistically significant in models 1 and 2, indicating that Table 3 shows the regression results on government expenditure change. Countries in IMF programs are likely to reduce the change of government spending by roughly 9 to 10 percent compared to non-participating countries. This is a large effect compared to other control variables. What we are more interested in, however, is the expected potential outcome without the program for the participating countries and the difference between the expected outcomes in the program and without the program. In International reserves also have a positive association with expenditure change.
Countries with flexible exchange rate regimes are likely to have higher rate of change in government expenditures by 5 -6 percent. This result confirms the claim that a fixed exchange regime is more likely to discipline government budget balance. Countries that have a larger agricultural sector in the economy are likely to have a higher rate of increase in government spending. Lastly, hazard rates are statistically significant in all three models, indicating the presence of selection bias.
43) The value was calculated using STATA. 44) Guitian (1995) .
they are in the program is 30.61 percent. Given the findings by previous studies that IMF programs undermine growth, the results in Table 4 that IMF participation reduces the rate of revenue change are plausible. Increasing revenue is not likely to be as easy as cutting expenditure in many cases, particularly when the economy is bad. Developing countries that rely heavily on foreign capital, when their economy is bad enough to ask for help from the IMF, may experience capital flight because they cause foreign investors to lose confidence in their economy. Furthermore, developing countries usually lack efficient institutional framework for collecting tax and increasing tax base.
Traditional IMF conditionality has not successfully addressed such institutional aspect of reform. From the results of this study, it is difficult to predict the long-term effects of the programs. It could be that IMF programs are not effective at all in increasing government revenue, and countries under IMF agreements that reduce deficits mainly do so through expenditure cuts. Or it could be that the revenue side policies of IMF programs take effects very slowly. What one can learn from the findings is that conditionality does work at least on the expenditure reduction side. At the same time, if IMF programs fail to increase revenue even in the long run and simply continue to cut expenditures, this will create problems in the economy, particularly when governments will not be able to spend on education and human resources development. Therefore, one important question for future research would be whether IMF programs are effective in the long-term, particularly in increasing revenue.
Overall, the findings of this research bring with them broader lessons for the study of international institutions. On the practical side, policy makers at both national and international levels will find this research valuable. For national policy makers, the findings will carry important implications for the politics of selecting and complying with IMF agreements. At the international level, the findings will help the IMF reassess the adjustment programs and ultimately build an improved international financial architecture. 
